Modus ponens provides the central theme. There are laws, of the form A → C. A logic (or other theory) L collects such laws. Any datum A (or theory T incorporating such data) provides input to the laws of L. The central ternary relation R relates theories L; T and U , where U consists of all of the outputs C got by applying modus ponens to major premises from L and minor premises from T . Underlying this relation is a modus ponens product (or fusion) operation • on theories (or other collections of formulas) L and T , whence RLTU i L • T ⊆ U . These ideas have been expressed, especially with Routley, as (Kripke style) worlds semantics for relevant and other substructural logics.
Introduction
Logic is the science of rational inference. Founded by Aristotle, it has through the introduction of mathematical methods made remarkable progress in the past century and a half. Polish logicians-headed by the great Alfred Tarski, to whose memory this paper is dedicated-have played a leading role in this progress.
This paper surveys some ideas of mathematical beauty, which extend Tarski's legacy. These ideas have resulted from three decades of investigation of the semantics of relevant and other substructural logics. Just as modal logics form a family, so also do the relevant logics. Just as there is a minimal normal modal logic K, just so is there a minimal classical relevant logic CB. Just as modal logics may be motivated via the relational properties of a binary accessibility relation, so can relevant logics via the properties of a ternary relation R. Of special interest is the correspondence between candidate axioms for relevant logics and the combinators of Curry's Combinatory Logic CL and Church's calculi of -conversion.
This combinatorial Key to the Universe will be a main topic of this paper, whose purpose (under the incisive prodding of a referee) will be chie y expository. We shall begin with a very brief survey of relevant logics-where they came from, and what are the central points of their formal and philosophical motivation. A regard for relevance will boil down to a careful look at the rule →E of modus ponens. That look will lead us on to theories, collections of sentences that are closed under entailment (in the appropriate sense).
Relevant logics
When does A imply C? The simple material answer, in practical vogue toward the end of the last millennium, is that this happens i either A is false or C is true. But this answer is so deeply unsatisfying philosophically that almost nobody believes it. (Belnap observes that Bertrand Russell might have, for a while.) At least, most would concede, A must be in some sense honestly related to C for a genuine implication to hold.
Church's use criterion for relevant implication
A well-known proposal-essentially that of [7] for pure → logic-tracks this sense of relevance. A → C holds (and we may say that A relevantly implies C) i there exists a deduction of C from A in which A is used. More generally (and associating → to the right) A 1 → · · · → A n → C holds i there is a deduction of C from A 1 ; : : : ; A n in which all of the A i are used. This is the use criterion for separating the relevantly valid, pure → sheep from irrelevant goats like the positive paradox p → (q → p) of material implication. This use criterion is discussed at some length in the standard treatise [2] . Supplied there with a Fitch-style natural deduction system, it is taken to motivate exactly the weak theory R → of (pure relevant) implication of Church [7] .
Central to the application of the use criterion is that 'use' means, at the pure → level, 'use in an application of the rule →E of modus ponens for →'. Also stressed is that it is su cient for the relevant theoremhood of A 1 → · · · → A n → C that there exist a deduction of C in which all the A i are used.
There are some subtleties in how this use criterion may be varied to produce di erent systems of logic, even at the pure → level. See [20] .
Adding extensional connectives to relevant →
The ÿrst relevant logic to build in recognizable truth-functional connectives and quantiÿers was the strenge Implikation of Ackermann [1] , which we identify here with the E (of entailment) of Anderson and Belnap [2] and the E ∀∃x (of ÿrst-order entailment) of Anderson et al. [3] . These systems add ∧; ∨ and ∼ at the propositional level, intended as truth-functional 'and', 'or' and 'not'; roughly speaking, ∧ and ∨ are distributive lattice connectives, and duals relative to the (DeMorgan) negation ∼. Similarly enriching R → produces a full propositional logic R.
What, in the presence of these truth-functional connectives, becomes of the use criterion? Its care and feeding become in practice more delicate. Su ce it to say here that the composition of premisses under → E must be supplemented by attending to their composition under the rule ∧ I of conjunction introduction. I shall not, at this point, go into technical details, save to note that the result remains mathematically coherent.
Bunching premisses relevantly
Well, I will go into a few technical details, about how premisses are bunched for relevantly valid argument. We saw that, at the pure → level, it must be possible to use all the hypotheses of an argument for the conclusion to have been derived relevantly. There is a relevant connective that does this bunching, namely the fusion (or intensional conjunction) connective •. Fusion stands to relevant → as extensional conjunction ∧ stands classically to material implication, for which we use ⊃ here. That is, we may contrast
Put in a way to gladden algebraists' hearts, → is the residual of •, as classical (or intuitionist) ⊃ is the residual of ∧.
We have just seen that full relevant logics like E have both a relevant implication → and an extensional conjunction ∧. But where is their fusion •? One might ask the same question of the relevant logic R. Through a happy syntactical accident, fusion is in fact deÿnable in R, which Dunn invoked in [11] to produce the class of DeMorgan monoids. These are algebraic counterparts of R as Boolean algebras are counterparts of classical propositional logic. It then turns out, applying semantic insights as in [24] , that fusion (which is anyway wanted) belongs and may be incorporated in every relevant logic.
We have, at this point, two formal analogues of and, an extensional ∧ and an intensional •. This is the sort of thing that has led Lewis [18] to the complaint that relevant logics are logics for equivocators. We answer that to make this complaint is to misunderstand the utility of formal methods. Logicians model arguments in much the same way as physicists devise and apply mathematical systems to model the World. Our job, whether as logicians or physicists, is both to be faithful to the data of our trade and to formulate the laws of that trade with as much care as our subject requires.
In Physics, this dual obligation leads on occasion to painful revision. Theories accepted everywhere bump into hard facts. Take some simple, satisfying law: we pick pv = nRT (from high school physics), on which the volume of an ideal gas increases with increasing temperature but decreases with increasing pressure. So it does, no doubt, but the law states an exact mathematical relationship. The ÿrst problem is that real gases are not ideal. The problem bites because under special conditions-very low temperatures, for one-this relationship becomes more and more inexact. And so the nice and memorable Boyle's law above gives way to (e.g.) van der Waals' equation, which is more complex but less inaccurate (until it too breaks down).
Something like this is what classical logic has done to us. Its simplicities bring joy. (Everyone comes to comprehend truth tables.) But its oversimpliÿcations bring agony. (Many of the traditional problems in Philosophy of Science are pseudo-problems induced by what was naively taken to be Our Logic.) If a false A may be taken with Russell to imply everything, why has there been a problem of counterfactual conditionals? And why will the student fail her history examination if she says that the reason for the outbreak of World War I is that sugar is sweet? "I have given you," she may insist, "a true antecedent of what logicians say is a true conditional. If that does not count as a reason, what does?" But let us not dwell further on the straightforward contradiction by the data of a favored theory. If Logic were Physics, van der Waals (to say nothing of Einstein and Bohr) would long since have revised the theory to take better account of the data. And this returns us to bunches, and to how premisses are put together for the sake of argument. The extensional intuition, built into ordinary ∧, is that it su ces to use one of the A's in A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n to have a valid argument. The relevant intuition, appropriate to fusion •, is that there must be a way of using all of the A's in We commit no o ense against reason (and certainly do not equivocate) in having for theoretical reasons 2 distinct formal counterparts of and, each subject to its own laws, in our formal logic. And we may now, adapting for the general case the Gentzen-style analyses of R+ of [12, 26] , bunch our premisses as we will, to any desired depth of nesting, taking for granted only those principles of collection that a logic enforces for the mode of conjoining in question.
Relevant semantics
Yes, but what do these relevant logics like R and E amount to semantically? This was for a while a seriously open question. [14, 30, 33] began to supply some answers.
A modal paradigm for unary and ♦
As I see it, the semantics of relevant logics generalizes on the plan that Kripke and others developed for the explication of modal logics. On the plan of [16] we have a collection K of worlds, related by a 2-place accessibility relation R. We may say that w sees w just in case wRw . The key Kripke truth-conditions on the 1-place modal operators ♦ and are then the following:
T ♦: ♦A is true at w i A is true at some w that w sees. T : A is true at w i A is true at every w that w sees.
Applying the paradigm to relevant → and •
What is the plan for a similar explication of the (irreducibly) 2-place operator →? The simplest (and most Tarskian) course is to introduce a 3-place relation R. We need some English expression that will do for a ternary R what sees does for a binary R. So let us survey again those native insights that render irrelevance objectionable. While lots of things in the world are connected, various other things are unconnected.
The logical signal that A and B are connected is that the implication A → B is true. Without growing too metaphysical here, we remind readers that there is an old story on which the premisses of a good argument are necessarily connected to its conclusion. Modern modal logic sought to take account of the ingredient of necessity in this story. But the only immediately obvious connection was that o ered by the material ⊃, with all its indi erence to real relations among propositions or in the world. 1 We have told another story. When one wishes to state the rule of modus ponens for →, there are many apparently equivalent ways of stating it. In (pigeon) Formalese, here are a few:
. 1 We reject, as noted above, the notational imperialism on which even the material conditional is so often symbolized by → these days. In this paper we follow Peano and Whitehead and Russell and (in his heyday) Quine in using ⊃, leaving → for an honest implication. 2 We use, here and henceforth, ⊃ metalogically to express rules. Like →, the convention on ⊃ is that implicative particles associate to the right, with logical particles binding more tightly than metalogical ones. We use ≡ for 2-sided rules. For binary particles the full precedence order is •; ∧; ∨; →; 6; ¿; ⊃; ≡.
People sunk in classical lassitude will not notice much di erence among (a) -(d). Recall, though, that traditionally logicians distinguished between the major premiss A → B of modus ponens and its minor premiss A. That is, modus ponens comes with a direction, with the major premiss taking us from the minor to the conclusion. I am accordingly inclined, these days, always to state the rule according to the rubric (d), dismissing (a) and (c) as lazy alternatives and feeling comfortable with (b) only if and means what • says in Formalese.
Think initially of the ÿrst argument of our ternary relation R as a domain of necessary connections-more brie y, of laws. These do not have to be laws of logicbiologists, computer scientists, physicists and economists have as much responsibility for stating the laws of their subjects as logicians have for setting out theirs. Whatever the source of such laws, we take it to be the job of → statements to express them syntactically. They are major premisses. The second argument of R takes account of the initial conditions supplied to laws-brie y, of input. Nor do we assume in general that the input belongs to the same world (or theory) as the law. It is a commonplace, after all, that the job of experiment is to provide data to conÿrm (or perhaps to refute) candidate laws. It is a methodological no-no to confuse the laws with the data. The third argument of ternary R tallies the result of applying the laws to the input; in a nutshell, it is the output.
With those ideas in mind, let us give necessary connection a direction by reading ternary Rwxy as (1) w directs x to y. Retaining the worlds metaphor, while dropping as in [31] any constraint that the worlds in question be logical or even possible, let us say, for any world w and formula A, that (2) w is an A-world if and only if (3) A is true at w. We now recall from [32] the key relevant truth-conditions on the 2-place implication connective → and the fusion connective • discussed in Section 1.3 above. (cf. also, e.g., [30] ).
T →: A → C is true at w i w directs all A-worlds to C-worlds:
T •: A• C is true at w i there exists an A-world that directs a C-world to w:
We introduce some notation henceforth to express truth-conditions like T → (which leads as in [23] to nice translations of relevant logics into standard ÿrst-order logic). We express formulas as predicates of worlds, and appeal to standard notational conventions. We get
as succinct ways of expressing the above truth-conditions.
Extensional connectives interpreted truth-functionally
We will express truth-conditions on logical particles in accordance with the conventions just introduced. Extensional ∧ and ∨ are interpreted as one expects.
Handling negation is a little trickier. On the [31] semantics, the original relevant DeMorgan negation ∼ is interpreted via a (Polish) technical maneuver, using an auxiliary unary operation * on worlds. The resulting truth-condition is
Also of interest is making Boolean negation ¬ explicit, satisfying
We postpone for now any further discussion of negation.
Demythologized worlds are theories
We have promised not to grow too metaphysical. On the other hand, the modal paradigm enriched for a relevant framework provides a worlds semantics. It is time to cash out those worlds in less exorbitant terms-to demythologize them. Happily the ingredients for this task are at hand. For our completeness proofs were presented using theories, which will do as the worlds desired.
Theories deÿned
A theory is a set of statements that hangs together logically. Its time to put a little meat on those bones. We suppose, in the ÿrst place, that we have a logic L, which furnishes a binary relation of logical consequence. We will use A6B to indicate that B follows from A, according to logic L. 3 Then the least that we can demand of an L-theory X is that it respect 6. I.e.,
On the other hand, we also expect a theory X to respect logical conjunction ∧. I.e.,
It has become traditional in work on the algebra and semantics of relevant logics to characterize X as an L-theory just in case it satisÿes 6E and ∧ I for all formulas A and B.
Truth-functional expectations on theories
But not all theories are created equal. There are also the intended meanings of other logical particles, like 'or' and 'not'. Surely some preference is to be given to theories that also respect what we intend by these particles. For example, the following conditions are imposed on theory X by our regulative ideals, as expressed in the truthconditions T ∧; T ∨ and T ¬ in Section 2.3.
∧EI:
A ∈ X and B ∈ X i A ∧ B ∈ X:
These conditions fare di erently in various relevant (and other) logics. ∧EI is more or less built in-ÿrst, by the imposition of ∧I on all theories; second, by the standard character of A ∧ B6A and A ∧ B6B. The ∨I half of ∨EI likewise tends to be built in, since A6A ∨ B and B6A ∨ B are also standard. But ∨E is more di cult to come by. 4 Some intricate technical maneuvers accompany this point in semantical completeness proofs, often involving the distributive lattice properties of the usual relevant logics. Finally, we turn to the care and feeding of negation, which is even more di cult to come by. In the long run, we prefer our theories to be consistent and complete with respect to negation. But in practice, we are usually not yet in the long run. On this point too, delicate results turn.
Modus ponens products
Let X; Y and Z be any sets of formulas-not further speciÿed for the moment, but we are aiming at theories. Let us deÿne on such formula sets the following operation •:
The operation • has had various names. Powers introduced it in [27] as modus ponens product. Fine [14] called it fusion. But the intuition behind it is one that we have been driving at throughout this paper, especially since Section 2.2. A formula C belongs to X • Y just in case there is some way of performing modus ponens, taking a major premiss A → C from X and a minor one A from Y , getting C by an →E move.
And now here is the canonical relation R, on theories X; Y; Z.
That's it. The magical ternary relation arises, on theories, as a way of looking after modus ponens.
But why, you may ask, did we not deÿne the fusion operation • directly on theories, together with some truth-condition like the following?
T →• was (near enough) the original truth-condition on relevant →, in Urquhart's semilattice semantics for R → worked out in [33] and independently in unpublished work by Routley. Again independently, Fine [14] proposed T →• as a central ingredient in Fine's operational-relational semantics for relevant logics. It lurks in the background of the relational semantics. But I do not yet see a smooth way of moving it to the foreground.
The calculus of relevant theories
Let then L be a given (relevant, or even irrelevant) logic. Formulas A are built up as usual from propositional variables p under ∧; ∨; → and perhaps other connectives and propositional constants. We use S for the set of all formulas. We presume the entailment relation A6C on
We already deÿned Ltheories via 6-closure and ∧-closure above. (Algebraists would call them ÿlters, as Dunn [11] observed.)
We turn now to the Calculus of L-theories CLT = CLT; •; ⊆ , where CLT is the set of all L-theories, 5 • is the binary modus ponens product (or fusion) operation deÿned on sets of formulas by D • above and ⊆ is the subset (here, subtheory) relation. It is normally a simple exercise, safely left to readers, to show that CLT is indeed closed under •.
Combinatory logic CL
In Section 2.2 we laid down truth-conditions for the properly relevant connectives → and •. But we have not yet said anything about the semantical postulates to be imposed on the 3-place relation that builds in the direction enjoined by modus ponens. Such postulates, applied to the 2-place relation that served as our paradigm in Section 2.1, enabled Kripke [16] and others to characterize various modal logics and to distinguish them from each other. What will serve as a guide to do the same for relevant logics?
Our answer is "Combinatory Logic" (henceforth, CL) in the sense of Curry. We give a quick recapitulation of central ideas. The atoms of CL consist of countably many variables (for which we use 'x', etc.) and some primitive constants (among them some selection among I; S; K; B; B ; W; C, and perhaps others). The terms (or, following [9] , the obs) are built up from atoms and constants using a single binary operation symbol, for which we use '•', interpreted as the application of a 1-place function to an argument. We use 'M ', 'N ', etc. for arbitrary obs.
The intuitive universe of CL consists of 1-place functions. But n-place functions may be simulated (or curried, though the original idea seems to have been Sch onÿnkel's) by iterated application of 1-place functions. Parentheses are used for grouping subterms, subject to the conventions of (a) dropping '•' for simple juxtaposition and (b) associating to the left, for ease in reading terms. We deal here only with pure combinatory logic, building up its theory of (weak) equality.
We begin with axioms for 1-step contraction, for which we use '¿ 1 '. Each constant is governed by an accompanying axiom (scheme) for ¿ 1 That is enough for now. We will use ¿ for the re exive, transitive closure of ¿ 1 , imposing the additional monotonic principles
Suppose that X ¿Y in CL. We then say that X contracts (or reduces) to Y , and that Y expands to X . Similarly we may say that Y is a contraction of X , and that X is an expansion of Y . The aim of CL is to develop a theory of the equality of functions. So we introduce a further predicate '=', which is the symmetric and transitive closure of ¿. Central to the epitheory of CL is however the following theorem, stated in [9] as Church-Rosser theorem. Suppose X = Y . Then there is a Z such that X ¿Z and Y ¿Z.
This theorem establishes the consistency of CL. So there is a central sense in which the CL theory of equality is grounded and secured in its theory of reduction.
Inspired by Powers [27] , I devised around 1970 the Fools Model (FMO) of Combinatory Logic. (cf. [22] .) Here, all the combinators are simply taken as the closure under substitution of their "Curry types"-i.e., sets of pure → formulas. Application is simulated by the fusion operation • deÿned in Section 3.3 by D•, on arbitrary sets of → formulas. We write, temporarily, '∀[A]' to indicate the set of all substitution instances of a formula scheme A. Among the deÿnitions were these of some famous combinators.
4.1. Some FMO "combinators"
FMO sometimes models combinatory equality
These are among the identities that FMO veriÿes, where X; Y; Z are any sets of → formulas:
These correspond, in the vocabulary of Combinatory Logic, to 1-step reductions. We saw above that (weak) combinatory equality is the re exive, transitive, symmetric and monotonic closure of 1-step reduction. We deÿne BCI-combinators inductively by (1) B; C, and I are BCI-combinators, We have then BCI equality fact. Let the BCI obs M and N be demonstrably weakly equal in CL. Then also v(M ) = v(N ) in FMO, where v is any assignment of sets of →-formulas to variables which respects • and the ÿxed interpretation of the BCI-combinators. The BCI-fact will hold moreover for any combinator deÿnable from B; C; I (e.g., as B is deÿnable as CB).
FMO always models combinatory reduction
Some of the other laws, sadly, only hold in the reduction direction. E.g., we have
WXY ⊆ XYY;
SXYZ ⊆ XZ(YZ):
Particularly disturbing is the K case, which almost holds as an equality. But KX = , where is the empty set of formulas. Could we not rule out ? Alas no, since WI = , famously. 7 (Still, there is an extension of the BCI-fact above to a corresponding BCKfact, for non-empty BCK obs.) But it is nonetheless true that if any combinatory ob M (weakly) reduces to a term N , then as in the examples above the corresponding subset relation will surely hold in FMO. The choice of primitive combinators under (5) is more or less up to us. S and K will do. We give a long list, since di erent choices of primitive combinators yield di erent logics.
The key to the universe
The above plot thickens in the presence of logical particles besides →. And (of all things) our modeling of CL improves.
Modeling I
A logical axiom scheme almost always 9 present is Ax I: A → A Let now I denote the closure of all instances of AxI under 6E; ∧ I , where 6 is the entailment of the minimal positive relevant logic B+ of Routley and Meyer [30] . 10 Amazingly, I so deÿned coincides with the set of theorems of B+. Note also, CL and fans, that I so deÿned has exactly the right properties to mimic the combinator I . For I fact. Let X be any B+-theory. Then I • X = X .
Proof. The l. to r: inclusion holds because I is B+, and B+-theories are closed under B+-entailment. The r. to l. inclusion holds on the reasoning that yields X ⊆ I • X in Section 4.2.
Modeling other combinators
Even readers who know relevant and other substructural logics well may be insuciently impressed with the I fact. After all, we saw in the BCI equality fact in Section 4.2 that even the Fools model FMO captures I perfectly. This is more than we can say for cancellators like K and K * , and a lot more than we can say about combinators with a duplicating e ect like W and S.
Let us begin with the duplicators. The most depressing fact in the Fools model FMO is that the combinator WI (which we henceforth follow Curry and Feys [9] in abbreviating W * ) ought to produce
a pure duplication, but instead W * = and then W * • X is the null set . But there is a remedy for this depression. It arises because, in FMO,
and there is no way to ÿnd a common substitution instance A → (A → B) of an antecedent of W and C → C of I . In the parlance of the automated reasoners, we cannot unify p → (p → q) and r → r. For the cost of so doing would be to identify a formula A → B with its own proper subformula A. That's why W * = in the Fools model. Our preoccupation with theories rides now to the rescue. In FMO, the "combinators" were sets of → formulas, closed under substitution. Suppose instead that we pursue further the policy in Section 5.1 by making all the combinators into theories, requiring also closure under both ∧I and an appropriate relevant entailment relation 6. This will do wonders for W * . For since (A → B)6A → B in B+, we have in B+, on a couple of steps of antecedent replacement,
For ease in reading the formula, set
We observe on simple FMO principles,
while the coincidence between B+ entailment and membership in the combinator I yields by (1)
whence by (3) and (4) and modus ponens
I.e., applying (2) to (5),
We must now pause for some annoying technicalities. The reasoning just gone through means that we have found a "type" for the combinator W * (which was more than Curry and Feys [9] could do). Ronchi della Rocca and Venneri [29] shows that we have done better. We have found a principal type for W * , which we set down as
where the schematic notation ∀[: : :} now indicates that the displayed formula is closed under all of uniform substitution, ∧I and 6E, where 6 is supplied by the minimal relevant logic. Having handled I already as ∀[p → p}, we expand the schemes above by likewise laying it down that
and similarly for "combinators" C * ; B , W; S, etc. Before tackling the cancellators K and K * , we pause for the ÿrst of our annoying technicalities. Back in FMO we observed that the reduction direction of modeling CL was the proverbial piece of cake. The expansion direction, though it was perfect on BCI-obs, just failed on the cancellators and duplicators. As it now turns out, it is expansion which is the piece of cake, while reduction is no longer so pleasant. We illustrate with W * .
Show W * • X = X • X , where X is a theory: Expansion: Suppose B ∈ X • X . For some A; A → B ∈ X and A ∈ X , by D•. But then, by ∧I;
Then there is some C → B ∈ W * such that C ∈ X . How in the world does this ensure that B is in X • X ?
There will be an answer (as the song assures us). But it is an answer sensitive to vocabulary, enjoined by Dezani's beautiful Bubbling lemma (2.4(ii) of Barendregt et al. [4] ). Meanwhile we look after the cancellators. We begin with the theories,
Our ÿrst aim is to show, for theories X and Y , that K • X • Y = X . We know from our musings about FMO that we are in trouble if Y = . Coppo and his colleagues found a neat way out of this trouble. (cf. [4] ). We will think of it as follows. The condition ∧I on theories assures that, where X is any non-empty set of formulas each of which belongs to the theory Y , so also must the conjunction ∧X of these formulas belong to Y (e.g., if {A; B; C} ⊆ Y then A ∧ B ∧ C ∈ Y ). Let us extend this thinking to the empty set . Lattice-theoretically, the meet (i.e., conjunction) of the empty subset of elements of a lattice L is conveniently computed as the Top element of L, which we call T ( [4] called it !, cf. [10] .) Intuitively, T will express the proposition that is true at every world. (T is a Church constant. Think of it with [3] as the trivially true disjunction ∃pp of all propositions, to be contrasted with the I-surrogate Ackermann constant t, the more interestingly true conjunction ∀p(p → p)). It is consistent with other minimal relevant ideas to lay down both A6T and T6A → T, which as in [4] we henceforth assume.
A T-theory is now constrained to contain T, and to be closed as just suggested. Now we can make short work of (half of) K.
The fools model perfected in B ∧ T -theories
In this section we zero in on a fragment of the minimal relevant logic, which will exactly model weak equality in Combinatory Logic. B ∧ (pronounced BAND) will be the fragment of B+ in just → and ∧, given by the following axiom and rule schemes:
We have seen that, to get past our di culties with the cancellators, it is advisable to throw T into the vocabulary, extending B ∧ to the richer system B ∧ T (pronounced BAT). Add to the above Proof. Assign the T-theory K above to the combinator K, and similarly for other combinators. Proceed as in the W * and K expansion arguments to show that if XY 1 : : : Y n = Z results from 1-step reduction on a combinator X , then
In general all that will be required for this veriÿcation is the "principal type" of the combinator in question, as above. The rest of the proof goes through inductively on the observation that ⊇ is re exive and transitive, while satisfying the monotonicity conditions, given
The party is over, as we saw above, when it comes to modeling contractions. So we had better pause for the Bubbling lemma (Barendregt et al. [4] ).
Then there is some non-empty ÿnite subset J ⊆ I such that A6 j∈J A j and j∈J C j 6C in B ∧.
We will now apply the Bubbling Lemma (henceforth, BL) to ÿnish sketching a proof that the contraction half of our argument ad W * • X = X • X is ok in FMU. Assuming B ∈ W * • X , we reached in Section 5.2 above the conclusion that there is a C → B in W * such that C ∈ X . To be shown is that B ∈ X • X . We must now look a little more carefully at the members of W * . Analysis indicates that D ∈ W * i there is some conjunction of formulas of the form (E → F) ∧ E → F which entails D in B ∧ T. D is in this case a particular formula C → B. Omitting the feeding and care of T, we get by BL, for some ÿnite set J of indices, C6 j∈J ((E j → F j ) ∧ E j ) while j∈J F j 6B.
Because C ∈ X , we have by closure of X under 6 that each of the E j → F j is in X , while so also is each of the E j in X . So, for all j ∈ J we have F j in X • X , by D•. By ∧ I the conjunction of these F j is in the theory X • X . But we just saw that this conjunction entails B. So B is in X • X , as desired. So it goes, as the reader may verify by consulting [4, 10] . The result is
Combinatory contraction fact for FMU. Let M and N be combinatory obs such that M (weakly) reduces to N. Then also v(M ) ⊆ v(N ) in FMU, where v is any assignment of T-theories to variables which respects • and the ÿxed interpretation above of the combinators.
Proof. The hard part in each case is verifying the 1-step reduction principles for particular combinators. Leaving that to readers (which they may look up if necessary, or apply BL case by case for extra fun), the remaining inductive steps are straightforward as before. Done!
We can now recapitulate the promised Key2U theorem. FMU models CL.
Proof. By the contraction and expansion facts for FMU. Done!
Semantical steps forward
We came in the last section to a rewarding realization-namely, that the semantics of relevant logics supplies, in its partnership with CL and , the veritable key to the universe. Before being too carried away, let us pause to see what we have unlocked. We were concerned a while ago to relate CL to semantical postulate sets for particular relevant logics. It all had something to do with bunches, you may recall.
Combinators and bunches
We have contrasted an extensional bunching, under ∧, with a relevant one, under •. But hitherto • has only made an occasional appearance in this paper, and that principally not as a logical particle but as the metalogical operator deÿned by D• in Section 3.3 on whole theories. Still, the metalogical operator can be parent to a logical one, since we set down in Section 2.2 a truth-condition To for evaluating formulas A • B at worlds (or theories) w.
On the other hand, we have ÿrm intuitions about how ∧ should behave. We expect ∧ to be associative, commutative and idempotent. It does not disappoint. What should we expect of •? That depends. In a strong relevant logic like R, fusion • is indeed associative and commutative; it even delivers semi-idempotence, since A6A • A in R.
(The extension RM of R also provides the converse-at the cost, alas, of fallacies of relevance.) But weaker logics like E and T chop away at those smooth properties of •, until none of them are left in the minimal system B of Routley et al. [32] .
I say that this is as it should be. For a choice among logics is at the same time a choice among combinators. To like the preÿxing axiom This behavior is ubiquitous. We can illustrate it at the level of B ∧, formulated explicitly in Section 5.3. We extend B ∧ to a system B[ →; ∧; • ], which makes fusion explicit and adds to the formulation above the 2-sided residuation rule expected from our discussion in Section 1.3:
We shall now revert to using simple juxtaposition for fusion •, associating iterated fusions to the left. Iterated →'s continue to associate to the right. It is straightforward to show that the following are theorems and derivable rules.
We now pin down the syntactic correlate of the Key to the Universe in the table below.
CL ob
Fusion fact Implication fact
Combinator Correspondence Theorem (CCT). Let L be any logic extending B[ →; ∧; • ]. Then any of the fusion facts is a theorem scheme of L i the corresponding implication fact is a theorem scheme.
Proof. We do a couple of cases, leaving the rest as exercises to the reader.
Df ; 6Re exivity,
6 ; Ru→• (twice); Df .
Implication on its head
Recall the truth-condition T → in the relational semantics
What happens if we replace it with this truth-condition T →r?
The answer is, "It depends on the logic." In our hitherto paradigmatic logic R, nothing happens. (Neither does anything happen in the linear logic LL of Girard [15] .) Put otherwise, → and →r are the same implication connective in R. But R is quite a strong relevant logic. But we have been lately thinking about minimal logics like B, from which the stronger logics arise by imposing special assumptions. And the equivalence of Rwac and Rawc, which justiÿes on the [31] semantics the identiÿcation of → and →r for R, certainly looks like a special assumption. This is true, as we noted in [24] . 11 If desired, we may add →r conservatively to minimal relevant vocabulary, together with the rule, Ru→r•: A • B 6 C ≡ B 6 A → rC 11 Dunn [13] , though generous in acknowledging indebtedness to [24] , misses this point. In fairness, it was Lambek who introduced →r to substructural logics. cf. [17] .
Having → r in the vocabulary brings back at even the minimal B+ level some characteristic theorems of R and LL, by mixing and matching the →'s. For example, consider
These variants of the C * theorem of LL and of R are already provable at the minimal level.
What is the use of this twisted implication →r? To begin with, we might reverse all the intuitions to which we have appealed so far, thinking of →r as the native implication and coming to prefer (c) in Section 2.2 as a preferential way of stating modus ponens. Thinking of implication (as we have) as resting on real relations between input and output, there is a neat and appealing symmetry in T →r-input a on the left, output c on the right and (implicative) relation w in the middle.
Speaking personally (and yearning as my faithful readers know to be traditional in all things), I will leave my own intuitions as they are, sticking with Aristotle on the point that major premisses come ÿrst, as in Section 2. That being settled, what should we make of →r? It is good, I think, to agree with Restall that the connectives •; → and →r form a family, with • as the parent [28, p. 30] . And since our logics, when we sought to plumb their depths, forced • upon us (e. g., in [24] ) to account algebraically and semantically for →, it would seem that in the general case they have no less forced →r upon us. We shall not, however, explore this line any further here. See [13, 28] .
The classical minimal relevant logic CB
The minimal logic B of Routley and Meyer [32] is the (conservative) result of adding a DeMorgan negation ∼ to B+, satisfying the truth-condition T ∼ in Section 2.3. More interesting, for present purposes, is the (still conservative) result of adding the fully Boolean negation ¬, governed by T ¬ in Section 2.3. The resulting system is CB (introduced as CB+ in [21] ). We formulate CB here with •; →; ∧; ¬ primitive, subject to the following deÿnitions. is moreover an interpretation of L in K if it satisÿes the appropriate truth-conditions T ¬; T ∧; T →; T • above. Note that the interpretation I will automatically satisfy appropriate truth-conditions T ∨; T ⊃, etc., and that the (Boolean) conditions on truthfunctions assure I (T) = 1 and I (F) = false always. A formula A is veriÿed on the interpretation I i I (A; 0) = 1; it is valid in K i it is veriÿed on all interpretations therein; ÿnally, A is CB-valid i A is valid in every CBms K.
We may, as a ÿrst approximation, simply identify the logic CB with the set of CB-valid formulas. We note the following easy theorem:
Finite model theorem. Every non-theorem of CB is invalid in some ÿnite model.
Proof. By adaptation of Routley's ÿltration method [32] , as by Brady in [5, 277pp.] . Speciÿcally, suppose B a non-theorem of CB. Then there is a CBms K = 0; K; R and an interpretation I in K such that not [B]0. If K is ÿnite, we are through. So suppose K inÿnite. Let Sub(B) = {A: A is a subformula of B}. Sub(B), at least, is ÿnite. We deÿne an equivalence relation Q on K by setting, for all x; y ∈ K; xQy i , for all A ∈ Sub(B), I (A; x) = I (A; y). Consider now the result K=Q of collapsing K modulo Q. At least K=Q is ÿnite (since the ÿnitely many subformulas of B can separate at most ÿnitely many worlds). We refer to K=Q henceforth simply as K , and to the equivalence classes that are its members as a , etc. K will be moreover a CBms as soon as we provide it with a 0 and deÿne a ternary relation R on it. For the second of these tasks, let R a b c hold i there exist a in a ; b in b and c in c such that Rabc. Then, ignoring 0=Q (except as one of the a ), we add a new 0 subject to the condition p0 on K ; R . Finally, use I to deÿne an interpretation I in K = 0 ; K ; R by setting, for each propositional variable p in Sub(B), (i) I (p; 0 ) = I (p; 0) and (ii) I (p; a ) = I (p; a) for a in a (recalling that the a agree on I on all subformulas of B). Extend I uniquely to all relevant formulas by imposing T ¬; T ∧; T →; T •. We wish now to show that, for all A in Sub(B) both (1) I (A; 0 ) = I (A; 0) and (2) for all a in K, I (A; a ) = I (A; a). . Argue as in the → case, assuming this time one side true on the associated interpretation and using the IH to show that the other side also must be true. In conclusion we have shown that the bad guy B takes the same value (namely false) at 0 in the chopped down ÿnite CBms on I that it took in the inÿnite CBms on I . End of proof!
